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 Abstract 
 
We present the first assessment of willingness to pay (WTP) for water supply change to be 
conducted in the largest city in the developing world; Mexico City. Two large sample 
contingent valuation surveys are conducted to investigate WTP for two levels of water service 
quality; maintenance of, or improvement over, current provision levels. This study design 
permits one of the first tests of the ‘scope sensitivity’ of WTP responses to different levels of 
baseline supply provision. This testing is complicated within the present case because, as our 
study confirms, higher income households typically enjoy better levels of current provision 
while poorer households generally endure lower current standards of water supply. We 
incorporate this heterogeneity of service and correlation with income within a suite of novel 
scope sensitivity tests. These confirm prior expectations that richer households enjoying 
higher baseline service levels would prefer programs to maintain the status quo, while poorer 
households enduring lower initial quality of service, would prefer schemes which improve the 
quality of supplies. The implications of these findings are further investigated by contrasting 
conventional benefit-cost analysis aggregation procedures with an equity weighting approach 
which confirms the difference in priorities according to initial supply conditions. In this case, 
the ranking of programs changes when the ability to pay is equalized across society. In fiscal 
terms, aggregate WTP figures show that authorities could collect the resources necessary to 
fund households’ preferred schemes and simultaneously substantially reduce current subsidies. 
 
Key words: Willingness to pay; contingent valuation; water supply; baseline supply  
 quality; income; scope sensitivity; poverty; benefit-cost analysis; equity. 
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1. Introduction 
Many large urban areas in developing countries face severe and long term challenges regarding 
the sustainability of their water supplies. The enormous volumes of water and the extent of the 
infrastructure development required to meet demand have frequently exceeded supply capacity 
and generated acute environmental imbalances (Hardoy, et al. 1992; Serageldin 1994; Water 
Academy 1997; Drakakis-Smith 2000). While the costs of addressing this issue are enormous 
and are frequently the focus of considerable political pressures within such countries, 
international financing agencies argue that the necessary resources need to come from domestic 
consumers (World Bank 1991; Brookshire and Whittington 1993; ADB 1999). These pressures, 
allied with greater reliance amongst such agencies upon benefit-cost analysis (BCA), have led to 
an increased interest in the assessment of households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for changes in 
water supplies.  
 
Despite the rapid growth in urban populations in developing countries, to date most applications 
have perhaps surprisingly focused upon rural communities in such countries. These studies 
suggest a positive, although highly variable, WTP for supply improvements (Brookshire and 
Whittington, 1993; Briscoe et al. 1993; Saleth and Dinar 2001) with some evidence that values 
were higher for groups enduring lower initial (‘baseline’) levels of supply (Altaf et al., 1992). 
The magnitude of estimated WTP can be substantial, reflecting the value of the resource under 
investigation. Based upon the few African and Indian case studies that have examined WTP in 
an urban developing country contexts it seems that WTP for improvements may lie around 5% 
of household income (McPhail 1993; Goldblatt 1999). Given that tariffs in many such areas are 
typically highly subsidized, these WTP sums often represent very substantial increases in water 
bills, ranging between 50% to 340% of current levels (Zerah 1998; UNDP 1999).  
 
Subsidy schemes are frequently prompted by the heterogeneous service conditions which 
characterize many large urban areas in developing countries. Water supply problems are 
typically unevenly distributed across such societies with poorer households enduring lower 
levels of service provision than their wealthier neighbors (World Bank 1988; Fass 1988; 
Goldblatt 1999; WHO, WHO/UNICEF 2000; Wegelin-Schuringa 2001; Saleth and Dinar 
2001). For instance, while recommended daily water consumption is 150 liters per person and 
at least 40 liters to ensure sanitary conditions, amongst poorer groups in developing countries 
consumption is likely to be less than half this minimum recommendation (Fass 1993; 
Drakakis-Smith 2000). However, while prompted by good intentions, subsidy schemes are 
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frequently economically inefficient (Brookshire and Whittington, 1993; Boland and 
Whittington, 2000). Given that the incidence of poor water supply is typically related to 
income distribution, with higher income households enjoying better water supply, wealthy 
households are at least (if not more) likely to capture the benefits of subsidies than are poor 
households (Serageldin, 1994; Briscoe, 1999; Schwartz and Clements, 1999; Boland and 
Whittington, 2000; Foster et al., 2000). This correlation between low incomes and poor water 
supplies raises empirical problems in the modeling of WTP and for undertaking BCA’s of  
investments in supply improvements and alternatives to subsidy schemes. Here analysts need 
to be aware that the income constraint will bind hardest upon those who are likely to gain 
most in welfare terms from supply improvements. The need to address this problem provides 
the central focus and methodological contribution of the present paper.  
 
A commonly applied approach for assessing WTP for improved water services is the contingent 
valuation (CV) method (Whittington and Swarna 1994). This employs survey-based techniques 
to directly elicit households’ preferences (Mitchell and Carson 1989; Arrow et al. 1993; 
Bateman et al. 2002). The technique requires the construction of a contingent market through 
which respondents may state their WTP for a specified provision change in a particular good. 
Because of the hypothetical nature of this market there is considerable emphasis upon the need 
to validate results. This is most often achieved through theoretical validity tests (ibid) wherein 
WTP responses are subject to econometric modeling techniques designed to test the conformity 
of findings with prior expectations derived from economic theory. Arguably the most important 
of these tests, and one highlighted in best practice guidelines (Arrow et al., 1993), is the ‘scope 
sensitivity’ test. This concerns the expectation that, as the magnitude of the specified provision 
change increases so should WTP (or, more accurately, WTP should increase up to a level of 
consumption at which demand is satiated and not decline thereafter).  
 
As noted above, when estimating WTP for water supply improvements within developing 
countries the scope test is complicated by the fact that income levels are correlated with 
current levels of supply, such that those who would benefit most from a provision change to 
some specified level are those least able to pay for such changes. We therefore need to 
discriminate between the influences of income and provision change upon WTP. This 
requires more than simply controlling for variations in income within an estimated WTP bid 
function as the level of provision change varies across respondents and is directly correlated 
with income. This study provides a solution to this problem via a split sample design in 
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which survey respondents are (unbeknown to themselves) randomly allocated to one of two 
samples, each facing a differing scenario as follows:  
 
• The first sample is presented with a scenario in which policy ensures that the status 
quo levels of provision (which vary across households) is maintained so as to avoid a 
specified ‘do-nothing’ alternative state in which supply quality would reduce to a 
specified lower level (equivalent to the lower bound provision level suffered within 
the study area). This is subsequently referred to as the ‘Maintenance’ scenario.  
 
• The second sample is presented with a scenario which improves supply quality from 
the status quo level enjoyed (endured) by each household to a specified common 
higher level (equivalent to the upper bound provision level enjoyed within the study 
area). This is subsequently referred to as the ‘Improvement’ scenario.   
 
This split sample approach provides the classic treatment test of any hypothesis and is the 
standard approach to testing for scope sensitivity (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). The 
alternative approach of asking the same group of respondents to value two schemes can 
encounter problems of sequencing where values become dependent upon the order in which 
schemes are presented to respondents (Carson et al., 1998, Bateman et al., 2004). 
 
The split sample, dual scenario approach also allows us to formulate two novel approaches to 
scope sensitivity testing. First, given the strong positive correlation between income levels 
and current levels of provision (which we confirm as part of our subsequent discussion of 
results), we have different expectations for our scope sensitivity test depending on the current 
income/provision level of the household. We expect households with higher levels of income 
(and therefore, typically, higher status quo levels of current provision) to have greater WTP 
for the Maintenance scenario (WTPM) than for the Improvement scenario (WTPI) as the 
former avoids a substantial loss in provision relative to the more modest gains of the latter. 
For similar reasons, scope sensitivity would require that poorer households (who typically 
have lower status quo levels of current provision) will have WTPM lower than WTPI as the 
former concerns a smaller provision change than the latter. Put simply, given a positive 
correlation between household income and current provision levels, then the scope sensitivity 
requirement can be formalized within the following hypotheses (in which the superscripts H 
and L denote higher and lower income households respectively):  
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H
I
H
Mo WTPWTPH ≥:1  
 
L
I
L
Mo WTPWTPH ≤:2  
 
This is a new form of scope sensitivity test, not assessed in prior studies. Yet we argue that such 
a test, is more rigorous than prior analyses as failure to satisfy both of the criteria given above 
would seem to suggest that WTP responses were not related to current provision and therefore 
did not exhibit scope sensitivity.  
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of 1oH  and 
2
oH . Here, we see that those with lower 
current levels of water service quality will have higher WTP for the Improvement program than 
for the Maintenance program. Conversely those with higher initial endowments will have lower 
WTP for the Improvement program than for the Maintenance program. Accepting (as we 
demonstrate subsequently) the strong positive correlation between income and the initial 
endowment of water service quality we therefore expect 1oH and 
2
oH  to be satisfied.  
Figure 1 
The water supply quality continuum and welfare measures for the Maintenance and 
Improvement scenarios showing links between initial endowments (current service 
level; correlated with household income level), scenario specific final service level, and 
corresponding WTP. 
 
 
 
Our second approach to scope sensitivity testing is more conventional. Here we selected 
subgroups of respondents for whom income is reasonably constant (denoted by the superscript 
YCON in notation below) but who exhibit some commonly perceived variation in baseline 
water supply quality. Following the logic of the above arguments we should expect that, as 
baseline quality increases so WTP for Maintenance of those supplies will also rise. Conversely a 
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similar set of (roughly) constant income respondents facing the Improvement scenario will be 
expected to reduce their WTP responses as baseline quality increases. If we model WTP 
responses for a given scenario as a function of this baseline quality (QUALITY) and a matrix of 
other variables (X) as follows,  
 
),( 1 XQUALITYfWTP jj ββ=  
 
where j = M for the Maintenance scenario and j = I for the Improvement scenario, then we can 
formalize these expectations into a further scope hypothesis as follows: 
 
YCON
M
YCON
IoH ββ << 0:3  
 
We test these various scope sensitivity hypotheses by conducting the first CV study examining 
households’ WTP for changes to the water supply service in Mexico City. This is both the 
largest city in the developing world and one whose water supply system exhibits many of the 
characteristics typical of water supply systems in urban areas of developing countries. In 
particular it has a highly intervened, subsidized tariff system and extremely heterogeneous water 
supply conditions which are strongly linked to income distribution. A large scale, best-practice, 
CV survey is conducted, collecting data for both of the design treatments outlined above. WTP 
results confirm the importance of current service levels upon WTP and implied preference 
ordering of the Maintenance and Improvement schemes thereby satisfying our scope sensitivity 
tests. Furthermore, we show how, if taken at face value, the magnitude of WTP responses favors 
the Maintenance scheme preferred by wealthier households currently enjoying high levels of 
service. Because wealthy households are less income constrained, their preference for the 
Improvement scenario over the Maintenance scenario dominates a conventional BCA even 
though it is low income households which comprise the majority of the population (a 
characteristic feature of urban areas of developing countries; World Bank 1991; Wegelin-
Schuringa 2001). However, applying recent BCA guidelines for the income-equity weighting of 
WTP results (H.M. Treasury, 2003), we find that, when the income constraints are equalized 
across all households, the priority ranking of proposed schemes changes with the Improvement 
scheme favored by poorer households now yielding the highest net values.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the water 
supply problem in Mexico City, overviewing current water prices and the investments 
required for sustainable service modernization. The third section discusses the basis of 
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economic welfare theory which underpins the paper and presents the empirical design of the 
study, detailing the two valuation scenarios and survey implementation. In the fourth section 
we analyze the survey results both in terms of heterogeneity of the service conditions across 
the study area and resultant valuation responses. Models of WTP responses are presented 
providing theoretical validity assessments of findings. The fifth section provides formal 
testing of the scope sensitivity hypotheses outlined above. This section also aggregates the 
benefit estimates, both by including explicit incorporation of weights to address income 
inequality issues and by using absolute WTP figures for investment purposes. The final 
section presents conclusions and implications arising from this study. 
 
2. Water supply conditions in Mexico City 
 
The Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (MAMC) is the second largest city in the world, and 
the biggest in a developing country, with almost 18 million inhabitants (INEGI 2001). In 
administrative terms the MAMC is composed of two federal states: the Federal District and 
the State of Mexico. The rate of household connections is relatively high compared to general 
developing country standards with the water supply network serving 98 percent of the total 
population in the Federal District, the core entity of the city. Official information sources 
show that within the Federal District the amount of water supplied for domestic uses is as 
high as 80% (CADF 2001). The MAMC consumes water at the rate of 64 cubic meters per 
second (m3/s) (GRAVAMEX 2001). However, this supply is insufficient to meet present  
demand with the current deficit estimated at approximately 10m3/s, of which 3m3/s 
corresponds to the Federal District and 7m3/s to the State of Mexico (JAC 1995). 
 
As in many other cities, infrastructure conditions are highly diverse throughout the Federal 
District. Some of the pipes in the city center were installed more than a hundred years ago 
and the problems of an aging infrastructure have been compounded by feedbacks from 
aquifer overexploitation leading to land subsidence (INEGI 1999). Such infrastructure 
problems have led to very significant leakage losses accounting for between 33% and 40% of 
the supplied water (DGCOH 1997a). This excess demand, fueled by such infrastructure 
problems causes a range of water supply problems such as low water pressure or shortages 
(Garcia-Lascurain 1995; DGCOH 1997; Schteingart and Torres 1997; Ennis-McMillan 1998) 
which significantly affect up to one million households within our study area (Reforma 
2002a). Such problems have resulted in households adopting a numbers of averting measures. 
Storage tanks and large underground cisterns are a common feature of many households 
  7
across the city  (Garcia-Lascurain 1995; JAC 1995; Ennis-McMillan 1998). However, such 
poor service standards are by no means constant across the city. On the contrary a number of 
studies have shown that while low income households located in the periphery often suffer 
poor service standards, residents of high-income areas generally enjoy a much better standard 
of service and consume high volumes of water (Garcia-Lascurain 1995; Schteingart and 
Boltvinik 1997a; Ennis-McMillan 1998). We would expect these variations in current service 
standards to be a major determinant of preferences between alternatives water supply 
schemes and be reflected in stated WTP for such schemes. 
 
Water prices and required investments 
Water tariffs for households in the Federal District are determined jointly by the local 
congress and executive and concerns regarding access to water have resulted in high 
subsidies and low prices for domestic consumers (GDF 2003). The average domestic tariff of 
2 pesos per 1m3 of water contrasts markedly with official cost estimates of 9 pesos per 1m3 
(CADF 2002). Typically subsidies are supposed to be directed towards essential needs, which 
means that, considering international recommendations, for a household of five members the 
amount required would be 12 m3 bimonthly (Boland and Whittington 2000). However, 
subsidies apply up to a consumption level of 180 m3 bimonthly such that almost a third of all 
households pay less than 20 pesos (about US$2) bimonthly which the vast majority of  
households (91%) pay less than 200 pesos (about US$20) bimonthly for water services 
(CADF 2002). In contrast, non-domestic users, industry and commerce establishments, pay 
on average 12-13 pesos per m3. This results in the non-domestic sector contributing 80% of 
the total resource collection (CADF 2001). As observed in other developing country settings 
(Boland and Whittington 2000), such a tariff structure appears to have the unstated objective 
of enforcing a cross-subsidy from commerce and industry to domestic consumers, regardless 
of the income of the latter recipients.  
 
In 1992 the water authorities initiated a series of reforms in the water tariff and collection 
administrative system. The main actions that have been undertaken to date include the 
elaboration of a census of all water users, improved detection of illegal connections, 
digitization of the network, reduction of leakages and installation of water meters. Over 
1,260,000 meters have now been installed, covering about 70% of the total users (CADF 
2001; Institute of the Americas 2001). Although revenues remain dominated by non-domestic 
consumers (CADF 2002), these reforms have allowed the authorities to substantially increase 
domestic tariff revenues (GDF 2000). However, while much improved, collection problems 
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have not been eliminated. In 2002 roughly two thirds of domestic consumers presented 
delayed payments (Reforma 2002b; Martinez Omana 2002). In part this reflects the 
authorities reluctance to disconnect supplies due to late payment (Shirley 2002). This may 
pose a problem for a CV study. If households believe that they will not in the end have to 
personally pay for a good then they may overstate their WTP in an effort to secure a benefit 
at no extra cost (Bateman et al., 1995; 2003). Clearly, in assessing the validity of WTP 
responses the CV analyst would like to control for any non-payer overstatement effects and 
we discuss approaches for assessing the nature and scale of this problem subsequently.  
 
The problems raised by the under-pricing of water are exacerbated by ongoing growth in 
demand. The authorities estimate that in the year 2010, an additional 18.2 m3/s of water will 
be required in the MAMC, an increase which existing sources cannot satisfy. There is a 
substantial literature regarding this problem (Sanchez-Diaz and Gutierrez-Ojeda 1997; Birkle, 
Rodriguez et al. 1998; Gonzalez-Moran, Rodriguez et al. 1999; Downs, Mazari-Hiriart et al. 
2000; SMA 2000; CNA 2003). However, these studies have focused almost exclusively upon 
the supply side with little attention being paid to demand and no previous assessment of 
WTP. The present study makes a novel and, we would argue, timely contribution to this 
debate by assessing households willingness to pay while explicitly considering the socio-
economic and equity concerns expressed in relevant policy documents (CNA 2003).  
 
3. The Study Design 
 
Welfare measures of the value of changes in water supply services 
Consider individual i who consumes two goods, X and Y. In the present application we can 
define X as consumption of water services while Y is a composite good measured in money 
units which we can define as the individual’s income.  Suppose we wish to assess the value to 
the individual of a change in their consumption of good X between levels xi0 and xi1 (where 
xi0 < xi1) as expressed in terms of the amount of good Y (the income numeraire) that the 
individual is prepared to give up.  Hicks (1943) defines a range of welfare change measures 
including some which assess individuals’ willingness to accept compensation regarding 
changes. However, such approaches have been shown to result in responses which fail to 
conform to standard economic theory (Bateman et al., 1997, 2000). Therefore valuation 
research has focussed upon the following two measures of the welfare change arising from 
moves between xi0 and xi1: 
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(i) Equivalent Loss (EL). Suppose individual i is endowed with the quantities xi1 
and yi, then EL(xi0, xi1, yi)  is their maximum WTP to avoid a decrease in 
consumption from xi1 to xi0. 
(ii) Compensating Gain (CG). Suppose individual is endowed with the quantities 
xi0 and yi, then CG(xi1, xi0, yi) is their maximum WTP in return for an increase 
in  consumption from xi0 to xi1. 
 
In the context of our present study design, the EL measure refers to our Maintenance scenario 
while the Improvement treatment yields a CG measure. Standard (Hicksian) economic theory 
implies that for given levels of xi0 to xi1 these two measures should be equivalent. If we 
accept this and accordingly denote either measure as simply WTP then we can write the 
utility function (1) 
 
 u(xi1 - WTP[xi0, xi1])  =  u(xi0)      (1) 
 
which just says that the utility of the superior provision level (xi1) minus the maximum WTP 
in respect of the change in provision between xi0 and xi1 would leave the individual at the 
same utility level provided by the inferior provision level (xi0). 
 
The scope sensitivity tests formulated as Ho1, Ho2 and Ho3 essentially examine the relationship 
between the magnitude of WTP responses and the size of the change in provision between xi0 
and xi1. The research challenge for (and contribution of) this paper is to allow for the fact that, 
because individuals are at differing initial (baseline endowment) levels of service, then the 
move to endpoint levels of provision (as envisaged in the Maintenance and Improvement 
scenarios) imply differing changes in WTP. This is further complicated by the strong 
correlation between income levels and initial endowments (and hence the size of provision 
change) at the individual level. This is allowed for in Ho1 and Ho2 by looking at the relation 
between WTP and income, and in Ho3 by examining a subset of respondents for whom 
income is constant yet some variation in quality endowments is observed.   
 
Eliciting WTP for water supply services 
As noted above, while not previously applied to the present case study area, the CV method 
has been widely used to assess WTP for water services in developing countries. The method 
typically uses survey techniques to ask a member of each surveyed household a series of 
structured questions designed to determine the maximum amount of money their household is 
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willing to pay for the proposed change in service provision (Mitchell and Carson 1989; 
Arrow, et al. 1993; Whittington and Swarna 1994; Bateman et al. 2002). As discussed 
previously, in order to implement our proposed scope sensitivity tests we require valuations 
for changes in provision which vary according to both initial water service endowments and 
final endpoint service levels. Such requirements are satisfied by the use of two valuation 
scenarios presented using a split sample approach. Here, roughly half of those interviewed 
value the ‘Maintenance’ program to avoid deterioration of supply quality to a common low 
level (set as the lower levels of service currently endured within the study area). The 
remaining survey respondents are presented with the ‘Improvement’ program which sets out 
to raise service conditions to a common high level (equivalent to the upper levels of service 
currently enjoyed within the study area).  
 
The survey questionnaire: development and structure 
The CV survey questionnaire (which is available from either of the authors in either its 
original Spanish form or as an English translation) was designed following a series of four 
focus groups. In line with best practice (Bennet et al., 1998; ASCE, 2003), these were 
conducted to assist scenario construction and conveyance via a survey questionnaire. Issues 
such as initial endowments of service quality, tariff and billing regimes and averting behavior 
(e.g. through the construction of water storage facilities) were addressed and the focus groups 
also identified the household bimonthly water bill as the most appropriate payment vehicle. 
Uncertainties regarding the longevity of bill increases were addressed by adopting a single 
increase in tariffs which would last for 10 years to coincide with the likely investment period. 
Given existing knowledge regarding implicit discount rates for public goods (Pearce and 
Ulph, 1998; H.M. Treasury, 2003), this period also facilitates ready incorporation of resultant 
WTP sums within subsequent BCAs.  
 
Again in line with best practice guidelines (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993; 
Bateman et al., 2002), the contingent market utilized a single dichotomous choice (DC) 
question to elicit household WTP responses. Such a design adheres to the principles of 
incentive compatibility set down by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) and developed 
within the CV context by Hoehn and Randall (1987) and Carson et al., (2000). Here the 
respondent is presented with a single buying price (or ‘bid level’) for the good in question 
which respondents may either accept or reject. The bid level is varied across respondents 
defining a bid vector from which a survival function may be estimated and welfare measures 
such as the mean WTP may be obtained (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999).  
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Previous developing country, water valuation studies have been criticized for using narrow 
bid vectors based primarily upon existing (subsidized) tariff levels (Whittington 1998). This 
issue was initially addressed through the focus groups mentioned previously (which 
confirmed that current tariff levels were artificially low relative to WTP) which provided a 
qualitative picture of the range of credible tariff increases. These were supplemented by a 
series of two subsequent pilot surveys (Soto Montes de Oca, 2003). In the first of these, 37 
interviews were used to test bid levels ranging from 20 to 500 pesos. These suggested that the 
lowest bid level was not considered sufficient to deliver improvements to the current water 
supply system, while the rejection rate for the upper bid level was high enough to trigger 
concerns regarding a possible ‘fat tails’ problem (Kerr, 1996). Accordingly a second pilot 
was undertaken in which 40 interviews were used to test bid levels ranging from 50 to 1000 
pesos. Findings suggested that such a range of bid levels should secure virtually unanimous 
acceptance and rejection at either end of the bid vector while remaining within the constraints 
of credibility (Herriges and Shogren 1996). This vector was implemented via ten bid levels 
using a typical, roughly logarithmic, distribution (Bateman et al., 1995), with each respondent 
being randomly allocated to a single bid amount. The final round of piloting indicated that 
such a vector performed well against recognized criteria (Kerr, 1996; Loomis, 2005) such as 
the achievement of a high rejection rate at the upper bid amount 
 
Survey sampling frame 
The sampling frame was designed to capture the variation in current service conditions (and 
related socio-economic characteristics) which was a focal part of our scope sensitivity test. 
This diversity was provided by sampling three zones (west, north-central and east) of the 
Federal District, the core area of Mexico City, as illustrated in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2 
The Federal District and the three study zones 
 
 
 
Existing official documents and census data (DGCOH 1997; INEGI 2000) indicated that in 
general the west  area includes many high-income neighborhoods and is characterized by 
high quality water supplies fed directly from external sources.  In contrast the north-central 
zone is dominated by medium income households which rely more heavily upon local wells 
for water and exhibits more heterogeneous service standards, with some households enjoying 
good levels of service while others are faced with some low water pressure problems. Finally, 
the eastern zone is the most populous and poorest in the Federal District. This zone relies 
substantially upon local wells many of which are overexploited and unable to satisfy local 
demand. The eastern zone  is also remote from external supplies and consequently suffers 
frequent water pressure and shortfall problems together with poor water quality, creating the 
need to transport water from other localities (ibid.).  
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Given these conditions the north-centre zone is of particular interest for testing Ho3 as we 
have higher variation in water supply quality relative to income variation than in other areas. 
Furthermore, by restricting our testing of Ho3 to just the main middle income group within 
this zone we can further sharpen this test by holding income constant as quality varies. A 
further advantage of such an approach to testing is that respondents conceptions of the quality 
of supplies may be relative rather than absolute i.e. what is considered a poor quality in the 
richer (better supplied) western zone might be considered quite acceptable or even good in 
the poorer (worse supplied) eastern zone. By testing within both an income group and a zone 
we should be examining more commonly held perceptions of service quality.  
 
Choice of survey mode was dictated by a mixture of administration costs and the importance 
of collecting a sufficiently large sample to operationalise the incentive compatible but 
statistically inefficient DC elicitation format (Arrow et al. 1993). Given these and other 
constraints (in particular regarding cost and interviewer safety), data was collected using a 
telephone survey utilizing a specified area variant of the random digit dialing method (RDD) 
(Dillman 1978; Sudman and Bradburn 1982; Frey and Oishi 1995; Ethier et al. 2000). One 
drawback of this approach is that, despite it being the area of Mexico with the most extensive 
coverage, only about 66% of households in the Federal District have telephones (INEGI 
2001). Given that consequent exclusions will be over-represented by low-income households 
this raises the distinct possibility that unadjusted WTP measures will under-represent the 
preferences of the poor. This was addressed in three ways: (i) oversampling of poorer areas 
within the overall study site; (ii) in calculating aggregate WTP, post-survey procedures were 
used to adjust for under-representation of different groups in our sample relative to the 
overall population and (iii) an equity reweighting process was incorporated within our 
subsequent BCA to allow decision makers to examine the impact of equalizing income 
constraints across the population. All of these procedures are discussed subsequently.  
 
In operationalising the RDD method, ZIP codes for neighborhoods in each of the three study 
zones were cross referenced between the telephone directory and a list of codes used for 
telemarketing purposes. This latter list allowed us to ensure a high proportion of poorer 
neighborhoods would be targeted, thus compensating for the under-representation caused by 
using a telephone based survey. The telephone area code was obtained from the ZIP code and 
remaining digit numbers were built by starting with the four root digits and then adding the 
exchange numbers starting from 0001. This generated a list of numbers for each surveyed 
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area (in Bateman and Munro (2005) we examine issues arising from the conventional use of 
individual level surveys to proxy household responses).  
 
The survey questionnaire 
The questionnaire (which is reproduced in Soto (2002) and available from that author) was 
divided into various sections to elicit the following information:  
 
1. Introduction: This section described the survey to the respondent and determined their 
eligibility for interview; 
2. General perceptions of the water supply service: This section investigated the 
consumers’ perception of the general standards of supply across the Federal District; 
3. Perceptions of the current service quality (initial endowment) in the household: 
Indicators such as household water pressure, shortages and water quality were 
obtained. Averting strategies, such as water storage and the consumption of bottled 
water were also assessed; 
4. Program scenario and WTP question: Here the appropriate Maintenance or 
Improvement scenario was presented together with a randomly selected DC bid 
amount for which WTP responses were elicited together with motivations 
underpinning these responses; 
5. Knowledge of current water bills: Failure to recall current bill levels may be linked to 
WTP responses via a number of routes. It may indicate uncertainty over the bill 
amount or that the amount is too trivial for the respondent to readily recall it. Both 
interpretations might be expected to be negatively correlated with WTP. However, an 
inability to answer this question might also indicate a respondent who does not pay 
their water bill. Such non-payers might be expected to overstate their WTP in an 
attempt to capture service improvements which they feel will be funded by others. 
Given this uncertainty of expectations, associations between this factor and WTP 
remain an open empirical question which we examine subsequently;  
6. Household socio-economic characteristics: Here questions elicited information such 
as the household demographics, employment and income profiles, etc.  
 
The survey was conducted by a team of eight experienced telephonists who were given a two 
day training course on relevant aspects of a CV telephone survey.   
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4. WTP RESULTS AND THEORETICAL VALIDITY 
 MODELING 
 
Full details of the diversity of sample characteristics elicited are presented in Soto (2003), 
with the following section providing a summary of those pertinent to the present study.  
 
Sample size and heterogeneity of service conditions across the three studied zones 
The survey was undertaken over 20 days, including weekends, during November and 
December 2001. Excluding non-responses and calls to non-residential numbers, a total of 
2,908 contacts with potentially eligible respondents was made. Of these a response rate of 
49% was achieved, which compares well with random first-pass, face-to-face surveys and 
reflects the high general levels of interest in the topic. A total sample of 1,424 household 
responses was collected of which 716 were presented with the Maintenance scenario the 
remaining 708 households faced the Improvement scenario. 
 
Survey findings confirmed that, when considered across the full sample, current endowments 
of service quality are both highly heterogeneous and strongly correlated with household 
income. Table 1 presents some indicators of the service performance by study zone as 
measured through three indicators: low water pressure (which is the most prevalent problem), 
poor water quality and frequent water shortages (a note concerning the definition of these 
variables from the responses given to the survey questions is available from the authors). A 
clear difference between the three zones is observed in almost all measured parameters. For 
example the prevalence of low water pressure is significantly lower in the West zone than in 
the north centre (p<0.0001) which is in turn significantly lower than that in the eastern zone 
(p<0.0001).   
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Table 1 
Service indicators in the three sampled zones (percentage of households) and 
significance of inter-zonal differences. 
Service indicators West zone North-central zone East zone 
Low water pressure 
(59%) 
47% 
(.0001) W-NC 
58% 
(.0001) NC-E 
72% 
(.0001) W-E 
Poor water quality 
(36%) 
29% 
(.248) W-NC 
26% 
(.001) NC-E 
61% 
(.0001) W-E 
Frequent water 
shortages (33%) 
20% 
(.0001) W-NC 
32% 
(.0001) NC-E 
52% 
(.0001) W-E 
Bottled water 
consumption (71%) 
61% 
(.017) W-NC 
68% 
(.0001) NC-E 
91% 
(.0001) W-E 
Water storage in 
cisterns (40%) 
33% 
(.005) W-NC 
42% 
(.008) NC-E 
51% 
(.0001) W-E 
Monthly average 
income 
5,981 pesos 
(US$598) 
(.0001) W-NC 
4,096 pesos 
(US$409) 
(.0001) NC-E 
3,088 pesos 
(US$308) 
(.0001) W-E 
Survey observations  566 493 365 
 
Figures in italic type are percentages of the full sample reporting problems with the service indicator. 
Figures in normal type parentheses are p value significance levels (from chi-square tests).  
W-NC indicates a test for significant differences between the west and north-central zones 
NC-E indicates a test for significant differences between the north-central and the east zones 
W-E indicates a test for significant differences between the west and the east zones 
The exchange rate at the time of the survey was roughly US$1 = 10 pesos 
 
 
This pattern of superior levels of current service endowment in the west zone, intermediate 
levels in the north-centre and lowest initial endowments in the east, is repeated across all 
service quality measures. This is also reflected in greater reliance upon bottled water and 
storage cisterns in the east where the quality and reliability of supplies are lowest.  
Furthermore, as Table 1 also indicates, this pattern is directly related to income distribution 
across the zones. The west zone enjoys significantly higher incomes than the north centre 
zone, which in turn has significantly higher income than the east zone (P<0.0001 in all cases).  
In line with the previous research reviewed above, we find higher household income to be 
positively and significantly correlated with all collected measures of water quality including 
fewer water pressure problems (p < 0.012); less water quality problems (lower water odor 
incidence, p = 0.037; reduced occurrence of residuals in water, p < 0.001); and fewer 
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problems of discoloration, p=0.006) and fewer interruptions in supply (p < 0.001). 
Households with higher incomes were also significantly more likely to report that they had 
not experienced any water supply problems (p < 0.001).  
 
Willingness to pay: Validity analysis and welfare measures 
Theoretical validation of DC WTP responses was achieved through the estimation of a model 
relating positive responses to bid amounts and a variety of variables derived from economic 
theory and empirical regularities. Given the binary nature of our response data we adopted a 
probit modeling approach estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. Such an approach 
is based on the cumulative normal distribution and consistent with theories of consumer 
utility maximization (Cameron, 1988). Contrary to approaches where DC data are analyzed 
as ordinary unordered data (Hanemann, 1994), the Cameron model assumes that the range of 
bid values are ordered, the threshold of the latent variable are observable and their variance 
can be used to identify the location and the scale of the underlying censored continuous 
valuation variable. This approach offers the possibility of generating individual fitted values 
for every respondent in the sample. The conceptual framework of the probit equation 
describes is compatible with such a model (Cameron 1988; Moffat 2002).  
 
Explanatory variables investigated included the bid level presented; household income; 
whether or not the household water bill was reported (and, if so, its level); a variety of water 
supply quality indicators (including frequency of water pressure problems, the incidence of 
any shortages, perceived quality, etc.); and various household and respondent socio-economic 
characteristics including respondent gender and household age composition, education level, 
occupation, etc.  For the probit regression analysis all variables were defined as interval or 
binary data.  
 
Analysis of the data revealed (as expected) that, when the full dataset was considered, the 
strong correlation between household income and measures of water supply quality prevented 
their simultaneous inclusion within regression models. Given the logic of causality 
(household income may well constrain access to higher water quality but the opposite 
causality does not hold) we retain the income variable over the inclusion of those highly 
correlated water quality measures. This approach not only produces models with higher 
explanatory power but subsequently also allows us to test Ho1 and Ho2. Table 2 presents 
comparable probit models for both valuation scenarios, while Annex 1 presents the underlying 
raw WTP response data.   
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Table 2 
Probit regression models of WTP responses for the maintenance and improvement scenarios 
 Maintenance scenario Improvement scenario 
Variable Coef. s.e. t Coef. s.e. t 
BID -0.00187*** 0.00020 -9.41 -0.00186*** 0.00019 -9.63 
LnINC  0.60824*** 0.11324 5.37  0.21077** 0.10274 2.05 
AGE -0.03120* 0.01735 -1.80 -0.06318*** 0.01746 -3.62 
AGE2  0.00031* 0.00019 1.64  0.00063*** 0.00020 3.11 
FEMALE  2.52326** 1.11020 2.27  0.71975 1.03198 0.70 
FEM*LnINC -0.32261** 0.13488 -2.39 -0.08154 0.12734 -0.64 
MEMBERS  0.05239** 0.02440 2.15  0.00097 0.02240 0.04 
DK_BILL -0.04382 0.10892 -0.40 -0.20693* 0.10625 -1.95 
Intercept -4.00298*** 0.99024 -4.04  0.25120 0.89151 0.28 
Notes:  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
Variables defined as follows:  
Variable name Variable description Coding Mean value1 Std. deviation1 
WTP Dependent variable (response to 
WTP question) 
1 = Yes, 0 = other Maint = 0.46 
Imp = 0.49 
Maint = 0.50 
Imp = 0.50 
BID Bid amount (pesos) 50, 70, 100, 150, 200, 250, 350, 500, 700, 
1000 
Maint = 309.94 
Imp = 305.98 
Maint = 294.35 
Imp = 290.85 
Ln_INC Natural logarithm of household 
income (pesos) 
Loge of 1250, 3750, 7500, 15000, 20000 8.04 0.84 
AGE Respondents age  Age in years (continuous variable) 39.34 15.67 
AGE2 Square of respondents age Square of age in years (continuous variable) 1793 1392 
FEMALE Gender of respondent  1 = female, 0 = male 0.64 0.48 
FEM*LnINC Interaction of FEMALE with 
Ln_INC variable 
From the above From the above From the above 
MEMBERS Total number of family members Continuous variable  4.80 2.27 
DK_BILL Respondent stated that they did 
not know their water bill 
1= not reported,  
0= bill cost was given 
0.42 0.49 
Note:  1. Maint = Maintenance scenario (n = 689; 27 cases with missing data); Imp = Improvement scenario (n = 687; 21 missing cases) 
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The models presented in Table 2 show expected relationships with explanatory variables, 
exhibiting consistent signs on coefficients throughout, although significance levels vary 
somewhat amongst those variables for which we do not have prior economic theoretic 
expectations. These expectations concern the BID and LnINC variables, both of which 
conform to theory yielding negative and positive relationships respectively.  
 
Considering each variable in turn, both models show a clear and virtually identical price 
effect with increases in the BID variable reducing the probability of a ‘yes’ response (this 
similarity of price coefficients across scenarios itself provides an important indicator of theoretical 
consistency; the value of money should not be context sensitive). Similarly the positive relation 
between bid acceptance and household income (LnINC) is as expected. Interestingly the 
magnitude and significance of this effect is substantially larger for the Maintenance scenario 
than for the Improvement scenario. This supports the hypothesized income/scenario 
preference ordering of 1oH  and 
2
oH
 as low income households are expected to be less 
enthusiastic about the Maintenance scenario, whereas it is expected to be the more strongly 
preferred option for high income households. This will strengthen the income/WTP relation 
above that observed for the Improvement scenario where low income households are 
prepared to pay relatively more than for the Maintenance program whereas high income 
households reverse this prioritization. We return to consider formal testing of these 
hypotheses subsequently.  
 
For both scenarios we observe a U-shaped relationship between bid acceptance and 
respondents age, with a minimum around 50 years old.  It is tempting to suggest that this may 
reflect the health priorities of respondents with the elderly and those with young families 
most concerned with water quality, ceteris paribus. An interesting gender effect is observed 
for both scenarios with FEMALE respondents being generally more likely to respond 
positively. This may reflect a gender divide regarding experience of the consequences of poor 
water supply quality (for example, women may be disproportionately impacted by child 
health issues associated with such problems). This interpretation seems supported by the 
negative FEM*LnINC interaction term showing that the gender divide is eroded by 
increasing incomes suggesting that it is poorer women who are most exposed to the negative 
consequences of poor water supplies. This is further echoed in the positive effect on WTP of 
increased family size shown by the MEMBERS variable.  
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The negative sign on the DK_BILL variable is interesting. Recall that this group includes 
both those for whom water bills are too trivial or uncertain for them to readily remember and 
(we suspect) those who have not paid their bills. We have different expectations regarding 
these two subgroups. If current bills are considered very small (too trivial to recall) then this 
may provide downward anchoring pressure upon WTP. However, non-payers may view the 
programs either as heralding greater enforcement of payments (a negative pressure upon 
WTP) or that there is the prospect of a costless gain if improved services are provided 
without greater payment enforcement (which we would expect to inflate WTP). The negative 
sign on the DK_BILL variable indicates that the latter group is less dominant than the former 
suggesting that strategic overstatement is not a major problem in the present study.  
 
The probit models allows us to estimate the WTP of each household in the sample (Cameron 
1988).  Table 3 presents summary measures of WTP aggregated across all households in each of 
the scenarios, irrespective of their income or current service level.  Using these generalizing 
criteria, mean WTP for the Maintenance scheme is 246 pesos rising to 293 pesos for the 
Improvement scheme. Confidence intervals are somewhat wider for the former than the latter 
responses reflecting in part the stronger variation with income for the Maintenance scenario 
observed in our regression models. Nevertheless, these means are significantly different 
(p<0.001), showing that, within our sample we have a higher WTP for the Improvement 
program. However, we need to adjust for the representativeness of our sample before we can say 
anything about the aggregate value of the two schemes. Before considering this, it is interesting 
to note the comparison of WTP with current tariff prices also detailed in Table 3. In both cases 
WTP for the proposed scenario is more than double current water bills, equating to 7-9% of 
income. While these may seem high, within a developed world context they fall well within the 
bounds (of up to 18%) suggested by previous research (Whittington et al. 1991; Briscoe et al. 
1993; Zerah, 1998; Goldblatt, 1999). Furthermore, we should remember that current tariff prices 
are kept artificially low by the substantial subsidies mentioned previously. Perhaps most 
persuasively, the sums stated by poorer households are of a similar magnitude to existing 
expenditure upon bottled water. Together these comparisons provide considerable convergent 
validity support for our results.   
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Table 3 
Household WTP measures for the Maintenance and Improvement scenarios (based on 
models in Table 2) 
 Maintenance scenario Improvement scenario 
Mean WTP (pesos/bimonthly) 241 290 
95% Confidence interval 225-257 280-301 
Median WTP 
(pesos/bimonthly) 
213 278 
WTP increment compared to 
average current water bill  
164% 197% 
WTP expressed as percentage 
of household average income  
5.2% 6.36% 
WTP + current average water 
bill expressed as percentage of 
household average income  
8.4% 9.49% 
 
Note: values based upon the functions reported in Table 2. Omitting statistically insignificant variables from 
these functions results in a very minor reduction in mean WTP from 246 to 241 for the Maintenance scenario 
and from 293 to 290 for the Improvement scenario. 
 
5. Scope sensitivity, aggregate WTP and BCA 
 
WTP and income distribution: Testing scope sensitivity hypotheses 1oH and 
2
oH . 
Table 4 reports WTP for the two scenarios disaggregated across five income groups. Tests for 
the significance of differences across income groups and scenarios are also reported. Results 
show a very clear pattern in the ranking of programs in that for the two lowest income groups 
(i.e. those with, on average, the poorest water supply services) the Improvement scenario is 
accorded a significantly higher WTP than the Maintenance scenario. However, this pattern is 
reversed for the upper three income groups. This pattern of priorities switching as incomes 
increase exactly conforms to the scope sensitivity tests set out in 1oH and 
2
oH . As the test details 
presented in the notes to Table 4 confirm, both of these hypotheses cannot be rejected (p<0.05) 
and therefore provide strong theoretical validity endorsement for our study. 
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Table 4 
Household WTP disaggregated by income group 
Income group (pesos) Maintenance scenario Improvement scenario 
 Mean WTP 
(pesos) 
Significance of 
differences across 
income groups 
Mean WTP 
(pesos) 
Significance of 
differences across 
income groups 
I. Less than 2500 57 
II. ** 
III. ** 
IV. ** 
V. ** 
212 
II. ** 
III. ** 
IV. ** 
V. ** 
II. 2,500-5000 259 
I. ** 
III. ** 
IV. ** 
V. ** 
317 
I. ** 
III. 
IV. ** 
V. ** 
III. 5,000-10,000 409 
I. ** 
II. ** 
IV. ** 
V. ** 
361 
I. ** 
II. 
IV.** 
V.** 
IV. 10,000-20,000 578 
I. ** 
II. ** 
III. ** 
V. ** 
421 
I. ** 
II. ** 
III.** 
V. 
V. More than 20,000 629 
I. ** 
II. ** 
III. ** 
IV. ** 
424 
I. ** 
II. ** 
III.** 
IV. 
** = difference significant at p<0.05 level. WTP differences between the two scenarios are significant at p<0.05 
level within each of the five income groups 
 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of these results, clearly illustrating that the 
impact of income upon WTP is substantially greater for the Maintenance than Improvement 
scenario. The figure also confirms the switch in the ordering of program priorities given in 
1
oH and 
2
oH .  
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Figure 3 
WTP for the maintenance and improvement programs by income group 
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WTP holding income constant: Testing scope sensitivity hypothesis 3oH  
The strong collinearity between income and initial endowments of water service quality 
precluded the inclusion of both income and quality variables in the models reported in Table 
2. However, 3oH  proposes holding income constant and looking for an expected switch in the 
sign of the relationship between WTP and the initial endowment of water service quality 
across our two scenarios. Essentially, with income held constant we would expect WTP for 
the Maintenance program to increase with initial endowments of quality. Conversely, again 
with income held constant, we expect WTP for the Improvement program to actually fall as 
initial endowments of quality increase. This switch in the direction of effects provides a clear 
and strong scope-sensitivity test of the validity of our WTP responses.  
 
To test 3oH  we first identify a suitable subsample within which income is relatively constant 
yet quality endowments vary. As indicated previously, the north-centre zone provides the best 
test-bed for such an assessment as it is generally characterized by middle income households 
but exhibits a variety of current water service levels (and as noted above, restricting the 
analysis within a geographical zone may also have the advantage of ensuring more common 
conceptions of what constitutes a given level of water service quality as respondents may 
have greater experience of supply conditions within zone as opposed to across zones). To 
ensure that income is held reasonably constant we also omit those residents of this zone who 
did not fall into the two major middle income categories (3750 & 7500 pesos per month).   
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The test is then performed by estimating the model of WTP responses reported in Table 5. Here 
we combine responses from both the Maintenance and Improvement scenarios and relate WTP 
to the current quality of service (QUALITY). Differences between the responses elicited from 
the two treatments are identified through the introduction of the IMP variable which denotes 
respondents facing the Improvement scenario and is used to form interaction variables to test for 
response differences between the treatments (full variable definitions are given in notes to the 
table). The central purpose of Table 5 is to test hypothesis 3oH  and this is achieved via the first 
two coefficients reported in the table. By including both the QUALITY variable and the 
QUAL*IMP interaction term we ensure that the former tests the relationship between WTP and 
the baseline level of water service for the Maintenance respondents, while the latter examines 
the departure from this relationship observed for the Improvement respondents. The coefficient 
on baseline quality for the Maintenance treatment ( YCONMβ  in 3oH ) is found to be positive but 
insignificant. However the QUAL*IMP interaction coefficient ( YCONIβ  in 3oH ) is both  negative, 
strongly significant (p<0.01) and of sufficient size to ensure that the overall effect of baseline 
quality for the Improvement respondents is negative. Therefore we observe that 
YCON
M
YCON
I ββ << 0 as per 3oH , which we accordingly cannot reject.  
 
The remaining relationships of the model reported in Table 5 (which is specified from the full 
sample models of Table 2, adding only those variables necessary for testing hypothesis 3oH  
and removing only those income related variables which are controlled for in the definition of 
this subsample) are of lesser importance but support the robustness of the relationships 
observed previously. The BID variable now denotes the base case (negative) attitude of 
Maintenance treatment respondents to increases in water tariffs, ceteris paribus. The 
insignificant interaction term BID*IMP shows that this attitude does not differ for the 
Improvement respondents. The AGE and AGE2 variables map out the same significant 
quadratic relationship as observed previously. Given the constant income nature of this 
subsample we omit the gender*income interaction, retaining only the gender effect. This was 
of low significance previously and is statistically insignificant in the smaller subsample. For 
similar reasons the MEMBERS and DK_BILL variables, of mixed significance previously, 
prove insignificant here. Finally the IMP binary variable indicates any shift in the function 
intercept due to the Improvement scenario, a shift which (as might be expected) proves 
statistically insignificant.  
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Table 5 
Interaction effects model of WTP responses (testing 3oH ) 
Variable Coef. s.e. t 
QUALITY              0.21976           0.24507 0.90 
QUAL*IMP          -0.80101***       0.33818 -2.37 
BID                -0.00173***      0.00047 -3.66 
BID*IMP             0.00029           0.00063 0.46 
AGE                -0.06853***       0.02741 -2.50 
AGE2                  0.00073***       0.00030 2.41 
FEMALE              -0.20540           0.16753 -1.23 
MEMBERS   0.05071           0.04082 1.24 
DK_BILL -0.12134           0.16940 -0.72 
IMP              0.19874           0.27407 0.73 
Intercept   1.82385*** 0.66178 2.76 
 
Notes:  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
Variables defined as follows: 
QUALITY  = 1 if household currently suffers frequent low water pressure problems (40% of subsample); 
= 0 otherwise (indicator of initial endowment of water supply quality); 
IMP  = 1 if response is for Improvement scenario; = 0 if response is for Maintenance scenario (Improvement 
scenario indicator); 51% of this subsample were in the Improvement scenario 
IMP*QUAL = IMP variable multiplied by QUALITY variable (Quality * Improvement interaction) 
IMP*BID  = IMP variable multiplied by BID variable (Bid * Improvement interaction) 
Other variables and dependent as defined previously.  
n = 271 (5 cases with missing data). 
 
The other relationships of Table 5 are of lesser importance but generally reinforce the validity of 
the responses. The insignificance of the intercept interaction term IMP suggests that the major 
difference between responses for the two scenarios is in terms of the slope of the quality 
relationship with WTP. The insignificance of the IMP*BID interaction suggests an absence of 
‘loss aversion’ effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) across the EL and CG measures of WTP 
for the Maintenance and Improvement programs (respectively).   
 
Conventional and equity weighting approaches to aggregation 
With WTP by income now calculated, aggregation proceeds by allowing for the distribution 
of the population across income groups. However, comparison of our sample with the 
characteristics of the general population showed that we had actually oversampled low 
income households (i.e. in our efforts to allow for the bias against poorer households inherent 
in telephone sampling we had over-compensated, targeting too many poor households). This 
is readily accounted for within the aggregation process. The first six columns of Table 6 
undertake this adjustment, by incorporating the number of households in the population 
within each income group.  By multiplying group mean WTP by group population and 
summing for all groups we obtain the aggregate WTP for each program, this being 4,146 
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million pesos for the Maintenance program and 4,039 million pesos for the Improvement 
scenario. This suggests that, taking the conventional WTP measure (i.e. accepting that the 
current distribution of income gives richer households greater ability to express their WTP), 
the Maintenance program yields higher aggregate WTP than the Improvement scheme. This 
ranking of programs accords with the preferences of richer households and is a common 
result in many BCAs.  
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Table 6 
Aggregate WTP values 
Income group1 
Group mean 
WTP per 
household for 
Maintenance 
scheme 
(pesos/ 
bimonthly) 
Group mean 
WTP per 
household for 
Improvement 
scheme 
(pesos/ 
bimonthly) 
Group 
population  
(households) 
Aggregate 
benefits for 
Maintenance 
scheme 
(million pesos 
per year) 
Aggregate 
benefits for 
Improvement 
scheme 
(million pesos 
per year) 
Equity weight 
(EW) 
Equity 
weighted 
aggregate 
benefits for 
Maintenance 
scheme 
(million pesos 
per year) 
Equity 
weighted 
aggregate 
benefits for 
Improvement 
scheme 
(million pesos 
per year) 
I.    Less than 2500 57 212 505,900 173 643 4.58 792 2947 
II.   2,500-5000 259 317 653,179 1015 1242 2.44 2477 3031 
III.  5,000-10,000 409 361 179,041 439 388 1.22 536 473 
IV. 10,000-20,000 578 421 358,081 1242 905 0.61 758 552 
V.  More than 20,000 629 424 338,252 1277 861 0.37 472 319 
Total (million peso)    4146 4039  5035 7322 
Notes: Aggregate benefits for Maintenance scheme = Group mean household WTP for Maintenance scheme * Group population  
Aggregate benefits for Improvement scheme = Group mean household WTP for Improvement scheme * Group population  
Equity weight (EW) = (population average income / Group average income) 
Equity weighted aggregate benefits for Maintenance scheme = Equity weight * Aggregate benefits for Maintenance scheme 
Equity weighted aggregate benefits for Improvement scheme = Equity weight * Aggregate benefits for Improvement scheme 
The reweighting and equity weighting exercises were undertaken using group mean incomes approximated as follows: I = 2000; II = 3750;  III = 7500; IV = 15000; 
V = 25000. Mean income (estimated by taking group means and reweighted by the actual population distribution) was 9158 pesos. Total population of the study area 
is 2,034,453 households. 
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While the conventional analysis indicates that the Maintenance program (favored by richer 
households) yields the highest benefits, as noted previously there is policy concern regarding 
the standards of supply endured by poorer households. The Maintenance scheme would not 
improve these conditions. However, the higher values accorded to this option are, as clearly 
demonstrated above, a product of income distribution. In recent years some economic 
authorities have advocated alternative approaches which apply some form of adjustment to 
recognize that WTP may be a systematically biased representation of underlying utility in this 
respect (e.g. H.M. Treasury, 2003). One approach is to apply an equity weight (EW) to all 
benefits constructed so as to allow more even purchasing power across socio-economic 
groups. Pearce (1983) discusses one simple variant in which the EW for some household is 
defined as follows: 
 
EWi = Population average income / Household’s income 
 
This formulation provides EW values which are greater than one for households with below 
average incomes and less than one for those with higher than average income. Specifically 
the adopted approach uses a particular instance of a utility weighting formula where the 
exponent is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income function with, in this case, the 
elasticity set equal to unity. This approach is adopted in the last three columns of Table 6 
with EWi calculated as above and then applied to the WTP values to yield an aggregate 
benefit value for the Maintenance scheme of 5,035 million pesos compared to a total value 
for the Improvement program of 7,322 million pesos. Therefore, as expected, the equity 
weighting process shifts the balance back in favor of schemes which benefit lower income 
households, here reversing the previous ranking in favor of the Improvement program 
preferred by those poorer households who currently suffer low quality water services. 
Finally, returning to our unadjusted (but population reweighted) benefit values, given that 
different areas suffer differing problems one could imagine a hybrid scheme which offers 
households a choice between the Maintenance and Improvement schemes. Assuming WTP 
levels remain unchanged then using the higher of the two WTP sums expressed by each 
income group as a guide to preference and consequent valuation suggests an aggregate WTP 
of 4,843 million pesos for this hybrid.  
 
Comparing benefits and costs 
When, through a series of subsequent elite interviews (described in Soto Montes de Oca and 
Bateman, 2005), the aggregate benefit results estimated above were presented to relevant 
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decision makers, the latter group saw this as an extremely useful input to the policy making 
process. However, a major issue determining whether or not either scheme will in fact be 
implemented are the institutional capacity and implementation costs they entail. At present 
the 3,200 million pesos of water tariff collected each year is supplemented by a subsidy of 
some 3,800 million pesos (Reforma 2002c; CADF 2001). The authorities have estimated that 
an extra budget of 2,000 million pesos annually would allow the service improvement in a 
substantial manner (Reforma 2002c). The aggregate WTP estimates indicate that these costs 
could be completely funded through increased tariffs which could be further raised so as to 
substantially decrease subsidy levels.  
 
While these results suggest ample room for reform of the present subsidy system, a degree of 
caution is necessary. While the equity weighting procedure may indicate which scheme 
yields the highest net utility, it still needs to be financed. This may impose long term, 
dynamic problems, particularly in the face of projected population growth. A scheme which 
guarantees a given albeit modest level of supply to all households may result in unsustainable 
costs in the face of demographic change, i.e. the equity weighting decision could, in the long 
term, make the investment problem worse, not better. While we did not have access to the 
cost data details necessary to undertake such an analysis, decision makers should always be 
mindful of the long term consequences of adopting any given strategy when certain of the 
long term determinants of scheme viability are not under their control.  
 
6. Conclusions 
A gap exists in the research literature associated with households’ WTP for water services in 
urban areas of developing countries. This study contributes to bridging that gap through an 
application to the developing world’s largest urban area: Mexico City. Our survey confirms 
that service levels are highly heterogeneous in its core entity, the Federal District. 
Importantly our results clearly show that service deficiencies disproportionately affect low 
income households while richer households enjoy high quality services.   
 
A CV study was undertaken to investigate households’ WTP for two programs; the Maintenance 
and Improvement scenarios. This allowed the formulation of three hypotheses testing the 
validity of WTP responses through novel variants on the scope sensitivity test. 1oH  and 
2
oH  
explicitly acknowledge the correlation of income and current service levels in determining WTP. 
Here theoretically driven expectations are clearly fulfilled with higher income households (those 
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which tend to enjoy better current endowments of water supply quality) being willing to pay 
higher amounts to avoid service deterioration than for the improvements. In contrast, low-
income households, which currently endure poor level of service, have higher WTP for the 
Improvement than the Maintenance scenario. These expectations underpin 3oH  which controls 
for income to directly show the influence of current endowments upon WTP; those with higher 
endowments report higher WTP for maintaining those levels but lower WTP for further 
improvements than those suffering lower current service levels.   
 
We feel that the major contribution of this paper is to highlight the vital importance of 
incorporating heterogeneous current service conditions, their correlation with income and 
impact upon WTP, within valuation studies of water provision in urban developing country 
contexts. The novel scope sensitivity tests proposed in this study provide a validity criterion 
which brings together these related issues and permits the analyst to examine the extent to 
which findings are consistent with theoretically driven expectations. In broader policy terms, 
this WTP information provides an input to the process of defining more equitable and 
economic efficient tariff schemes, identifying the priorities of different groups of households 
while adjusting for the varied income constraints which they face.  
 
In calculating aggregate WTP we adjust for an over-sampling problem so as to better 
represent the underlying population. Using the prevalent income distribution to conduct a 
BCA we find that the Maintenance program favored by richer households delivers higher 
aggregate benefits values. However, using an equity reweighting formula to equalize the 
income constraint across society reverses priorities such that the Improvement scheme 
favored by poorer households yields higher net benefits. That said, both the unweighted and 
equity weighted BCA show that the benefits of either scheme (or a hybrid combination of the 
two) were sufficient to cover the costs of implementation while still permitting a substantial 
reduction in subsidy levels and consequent efficiency gain.  
 
Analyses such as that outlined in this paper remain information inputs to the decision process 
and are no substitute for the decision itself. Nevertheless, the positive reaction to this study 
observed through our elite interviewing process gives us encouragement that the explicit 
incorporation of issues such as water supply heterogeneity, income distribution and equity 
impacts which form the basis of this study may provide a template for further studies and 
encourage their wider use within the decision making process. Armed with such information 
policy makers may feel emboldened to reject the continued reliance upon inefficient subsidies 
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and instead adopt economically efficient strategies for tackling long term problems of 
sustainability, while still ensuring that the water supply needs of poorer households are not 
overlooked.  
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Annex 1 
 
Response data underpinning the regression models. 
 Maintenance scenario Improvement scenario 
Bid level Total (n) “Yes” 
responses 
(n) 
Proportion 
“Yes” (%) 
Total (n) “Yes” 
responses 
(n) 
Proportion 
“Yes” (%) 
50 73 54 74% 74 64 86% 
70 77 51 63% 73 54 74% 
100 79 42 53% 80 52 65% 
125 73 43 59% 73 44 60% 
150 74 43 58% 74 40 54% 
200 70 26 37% 70 31 44% 
350 69 25 36% 70 25 36% 
500 68 19 13% 65 9 14% 
700 68 15 22% 68 15 22% 
1000 65 9 14% 61 14 23% 
                 Overall response rates 
“Yes”  46 % 49 % 
“No”  48 % 43 % 
“D/K” 6 % 8 % 
 
